ABSTRACT Decentralized attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an efficient and flexible multi-authority attribute-based encryption system, since it does not requires the central authority and does not need to cooperate among the authorities for creating public parameters. Unfortunately, recent works show that the reality of the privacy preserving and security in almost well-known decentralized key policy ABE (KP-ABE) schemes are doubtful. How to construct a decentralized KP-ABE with the privacy-preserving and user collusion avoidance is still a challenging problem. Most recently, Y.Rahulamathavam et al. proposed a decentralized KP ABE scheme to try avoiding user collusion and preserving the user's privacy. However, we exploit the vulnerability of their scheme in this paper at first and present a collusion attack on their decentralized KP-ABE scheme. The attack shows the user collusion cannot be avoided. Subsequently, a new privacy-preserving decentralized KP-ABE is proposed. The proposed scheme avoids the linear attacks at present and achieves the user collusion avoidance. We also show that the security of the proposed scheme is reduced to decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Finally, numerical experiments demonstrate the efficiency and validity of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to share data according to a policy without prior knowledge of who will be receiving them, Sahai and Waters extended identity-based encryption (IBE [1] - [3] ) and introduced the attribute-based encryption mechanism [4] . According to a policy over a set of attributes associated with the generation of private keys or ciphertext, attributebased encryption is categorized into key-policy attributebased encryption (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). Most of all ABE proposals are developed using single central authority which generates private keys of the users and verifies all the attributes or credentials it issued for each user (Fig. 1) . In a single authority attribute based encryption scheme ( [5] , [6] ), a central authority (CA) can control all the data and sensitive information of the users. In addition, the central authority needs to communicate with each user, it is a difficult task to manage numerous users' attributes. The single authority could become a common bottleneck. Chase solve it and presented the multi-authority (MA) scheme in [7] , where there are multiple authorities responsible for disjoint set of attributes (Fig. 2) . However, her scheme also needs a trusted central attribute authority for distributing all the keys. If the CA is malicious, it can compromise the ABE system. Then Chase and Chow further developed MA-ABE using a distributed PRF and showed the CA was removed in [8] . To satisfy the simultaneous goals of autonomous key generation and collusion resistance, Lewko and Waters [9] proposed a new multi-authority ABE named decentralized ABE (Fig. 3) . Their scheme overcomes the collusion vulnerability without any coordination between attributes authorities (AAs) but does not preserve the users' privacy. Then Han et al. proposed a privacy preserving decentralized KP-ABE scheme (DKP-ABE) in [10] . However, Ge et al. [11] pointed out that it did not resist user collusion attack. Subsequently, a modified privacypreserving decentralized KP-ABE scheme was proposed by Rahulamathavan et al. [12] . Rahulamathavan et al. [12] declared their scheme mitigated the user collusion attack employing anonymous key issuing protocol and achieved user's GID hidden. In this paper, we give a security analysis of the scheme of Rahulamathavan et al at first. We observe that their decentralized KP-ABE scheme has a bug in decryption and shows how to fix it. Then we give an attack on their scheme and show the proposed scheme cannot resist collusion attacks. Finally, we propose our own scheme, which can resist the collusion attack, and the security is based on the standard security assumption (DBDH).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the preliminaries used throughout this paper. In Section 3, a brief review of the scheme of Y. Rahulamathavan et al and the correctness analysis are developed. In Section 4, an attack on their decentralized KP-ABE scheme is given. We present the improved scheme in Section 5. The security analysis, anonymous key issuing protocol and user collusion avoidance are present in section 6, 7 and section 8. Then we show our performance analysis in section 9. In Section 10, we conclude the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, by x ∈ R X , we denoted that x is randomly selected from X , and by x ← R Z p , we denoted that x is selected from Z p identically if Z p is a finite set. By A(x) → y, we denoted that y is computed by running algorithm A on input x. Suppose that Z p is a finite field with prime order p, by Z p [x], we denoted the polynomial ring on Z p , which consists of all polynomials with coefficients from Z p .
A. BILINEAR MAPS
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G 1 and e be a bilinear map, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . The bilinear map e has the following properties:
• Bilinearity : For all g, h ∈ G 1 , and a, b ∈ Z p . we have e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab . • Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1.
• Computability: Group operation e(g, h) is efficiently computable, where g, h ∈ G 1
B. DECISIONAL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN (DBDH) ASSUMPTION
Let a, b, c, z ∈ Z p be chosen at random and g be a generator of group G 1 . The DBDH assumption holds when no polynomial-time algorithm B can distinguish the tuple (A, B, C, Z ) = (g a , g b , g c , g abc ) from the tuple (A, B, C, Z ) = (g a , g b , g c , g z ) with non-negligible advantage. The advantage of algorithm B is
An access structure (respectively monotonic access structure) is a collection (respectively monotonic collection) A of the non-empty subset of (P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n ). i.e., A ⊆ 2 {P} \{∅}. A set P is called an authorized set if P ∈ A, otherwise P is an unauthorized set.
D. COMMITMENT
A commitment scheme allows someone to commit a chosen value without leaking the value for a period of time and reveal the committed value later when it is needed. There are two properties in a commit scheme, binding and hiding. Binding: once the value has been committed to, its owner will not be able to change the value. Hiding: the value remains unreleased until its owner reveals it later. The commitment scheme used in our scheme is a perfectly hiding commitment scheme as Pedersen commitment scheme [16] . This scheme can be described as follows. Suppose that G is a cyclic group with prime order p, and g 0 , g 1 , · · · , g k are generators of G. . Then, the user can use r to decommit the commitment R.
E. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF
In cryptography, a zero-knowledge proof or zero-knowledge protocol is a method by which one party (the prover Peggy) can prove to another party (the verifier Victor) that she knows a value x, without conveying any information apart from the fact that she knows the value x. The zero-knowledge proof scheme involved in our construction is introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [17] .
F. OUTLINE OF DECENTRALIZED KP-ABE ENCRYPTION
A decentralized KP-ABE scheme consists of the following five algorithms.
Global Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter l as input and returns the system parameters params.
Authority Setup: The authority run this algorithm. Each authority A k generates his secret keys SK k , public keys PK k and an access structure A k , where k = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Key Gen: Each authority A k takes as input his secret key SK k , a global identifier u (GID) and a set of attributes A k GID , the key generation algorithm outputs a secret key SK k u for U. 
G. SECURITY MODEL
The security games are played between adversary and challenger as follows: Initialization: The adversary A submits a set of attributes A c which he wants to be challenged and a list of corrupted authorities C A , where |C A | < N . There should exist at least one authority A k such that A c A k / ∈ A k . Global Setup: The challenger runs this algorithm to generate the system parameters params, and sends them to A. Authority Setup: Each authority A k generates his secret keys SK k , public keys PK k and an access structure A k , where k = 1, 2, . . . , N .
1. For A k ∈ C A , the challenger sends the secret-public key pair (SK k , PK k ) to A.
2. For A k / ∈ C A , the challenger sends the public key PK k to A.
Phase 1: The adversary A can query secret keys for sets of A * GID , the only constraint is cannot meet the challenge access structure A C .
Challenge: The Adversary submits two messages m 0 and m 1 with equal length. The challenger flips an unbiased coin with {0,1}, and obtain b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the challenger computes CT * = Encryption(params, m b , A c ) and sends CT * to A.
Phase 2: The Adversary is allowed to make more secret key queries as phase 1.
Guess: Now, the adversary A output his guess b of b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as
Pr[b = b] − 1 2 .
III. REVIEW OF ''PRIVACY-PRESERVING DECENTRALIZED KEY-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION'' OF Y.RAHULAMATHAVAN et al.
In this section, we give a brief review of the scheme of Y. Rahulamathavan et al. [12] .
A. DECENTRALIZED KEY-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
In a Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) scheme, the secret key is associated with an access structure (policy), while the ciphertext is labeled with a set of attributes ( [13] , [14] ).
In a DKP-ABE system, multiple authorities can work independently without any cooperation with each other, any party can issue private keys to users. The ciphertext is generated under some attributes which authorized users need satisfied. A user obtains private keys from different authorities and is able to decrypt the ciphertexts if his attributes match the attributes specified in the ciphertext.
B. REVIEW OF THE SCHEME
There are n AA which are denoted as A 1 , · · · , A n . The attribute set managed by the authority A k is denoted as
The original algorithm in [12] works as follows.
Initially, for a given security parameter λ, global setup algorithm (GS) generates the bilinear groups G 1 and G 2 with prime order p, i.e, {G 1 , G 2 } ← (GS)(1 λ ). AA setup algorithm (AS) is executed by each AA to randomly generate public keys (PK) and the corresponding secret key (SK). The public-secret key pairs for A k is given as
Global Setup(GS) -For a given security parameter λ, (GS) generates the bilinear groups G 1 and G 2 with prime order p as follows: 
threshold access structure where k k ≤ n k . We consider more generic tree access structure. Hence we replace the threshold access structure into a tree based as follows: A k specifies m k as minimum number of attributes required to satisfy the access structure (m k ≤ n k ).
Key Generation(KG) -Attribute set of user is A u :
A k generates r k,u ∈ R Z p and polynomial q x for each node x (including the leaves T). For each node x, the degree d x of the polynomial q x is d x = k x − 1 where k x -threshold value of that node. Now for the root node r, set q r (0) = r k,u . For any other node x, set q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)). Now decryption keys for the user u are generated as follows:
Encryption(E) -Attribute set for the message m is
Data owner of message m randomly chooses s ∈ R Z p , and output the ciphertext as follows:
where I c denotes the index set of the authorities.
Decryption(D) -In order to decrypt C, the user u computes X , Y and S k as follows:
. User then decrypts the message m as follows: m =
We found a small bug in this paper. If
There must be a common k in g sβ k and h
sβ k r k,u +u holds and the decryption will be successful. Otherwise, the ciphertext cannot be properly decrypted.
A Solution. We can replace C 3 as follows:
Now, Y can be computed as follow:
Then, we can decrypt the ciphertext successfully.
2) CORRECTION
This scheme is correct as the follows equations hold. First, the user can use decryption key D k,u and C 2 to compute X as:
Then the user uses decryption key D k,u and C 3 to compute Y as
, According to the author's analysis [12] , their scheme is collusion resistant. Unfortunately, based on [15] , we find that their original DKP-ABE scheme is not secure against collusion attacks.
A. COLLUSION ATTACK ON DECENTRALIZED KEY-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
Without lose of generality, suppose there are three attribute authorities, A 1 , A 2 , A 3 in this system. Let A i monitors attributes {a i,1 }. Hence according to the scheme presented in section 3, the public keys and secret keys of A i are PK i =
However, u 1 only has attributes set A u 1 = {a 1,1 , a 2,1 }. And u 2 only has attributes set A u 2 = {a 2,1 , a 3,1 }. Now we use the secret keys of u 1 and u 2 to decrypt the ciphertexts as follows: 
= e(g, h 1 )
where
Hence, the collusion attack has been carried out successfully, that is to say, suppose the ciphertext is associated with attributes a i,j , a group of unauthorized users (none of their attributes satisfies all a i,j ) are able to access the encrypted data successfully, as long as they could obtain the completely secret keys of A k m individually, and ultimately make all of their attributes meet the attributes required in the ciphertext. Thus, the DKP-ABE scheme of Rahulamathavam et al. [12] fails to meet the security requirement of collusion resistance.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Based on the scheme [12] , we will make the following changes to the user's key.
The specific scheme is given as follows:
Global Setup(GS) -Take a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm outputs the bilinear groups G 1 and G 2 with prime order p. Let g, h and h 1 be generators of the group G 1 and e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map. There are N number of authorities {A 1 , · · · , A N } and A k monitors a set of attribute A k = (a k,1 , · · · , a k,n k ), ∀k.
AAs Setup(AS) -Each authority
We use the tree access structure. A k sets m k as a minimum number of attributes, which authorized user needs to satisfy(m k ≤ n k ).
Key Generation(KG) -A k u denotes the attribute set of user u, which is monitored by authority A k and A u A k = A k u , ∀k. A k picks r k,u ∈ R Z p and generates polynomial q x for each node x (including the leaves T). For each node x, the degree d x of the polynomial q x is d x = k x − 1 where k x is the threshold value of that node. For the root node r, we set q r (0) = r k,u , and for other node x, set q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)). Then, the secret key of user is computed as follows:
Encryption(E) -The data owner encrypts the message m using attribute set A m :
Then, he chooses a random number s and calculates the ciphertext as follows: 
Correctness:
The correctness of the decryption is given as follows:
The user can first calculate his private key component D = h u , then calculate X , Y , S k . The new decryption process is run as: Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary A who can break the proposed scheme with the advantage , then we will show there is a simulator B who can break the DBDH assumption by using the adversary with the same advantage.
Initially, the adversary A submits a list of corrupted AAs as C A and a set of AAs that he wants to challenge as A c , where
Suppose that there is at least one honest AA (κ for short) in the security game, where each user or the adversary cannot get sufficient decryption key.
Note that the whole proof of the proposed scheme is similar to that in [12] . In the proof of security, we only make simple changes to the simulation of D k,w and remove the D k,w . For the AAs who are not corrupted and not κ. We replace
and remove D k,w similarly. The specific simulation process is as follows: Golbe Setup: B selects γ , η ← R Z p , and sets h = g a g γ ,
randomly from Z p and computes
Hence the public-secret key pairs for A k ∈ C A are shown as
B sends the secret-public key pairs to adversary.
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2) For AAs who are not corrupted and not κ,
. The public-secret keys pairs are
B sends public keys to the adversary.
The public-secret key pairs are given as
B sends public keys to the adversary. [12] . In fact, since T k ( A k c A k w ) = 0, it should be stressed that maximum d x − 1 number of children of node x could be satisfied. It first defines a polynomial q x of degree d x for the root node x, such that q x (0) = r . For each satisfied child x of x, it chooses a random point e x and set q x (index(x )) = e x . Then we define remaining children nodes using polynomial interpolation. For each node x of x, q x (0) = q x (index(x )). 
where ∀a k,j ∈ A C A k . Challenge: In this phase, the adversary A will submit two messages m 0 and m 1 with the same length to B. Then the challenger B randomly chooses one of the messages and encryption it and sends the ciphertexts back to A. The correspond ciphertexts are set as follow: 
VII. ANONYMOUS KEY ISSUING PROTOCOL
To obtain the decryption credential blindly from A k , ∀k, the user needs to prove (to AA) that he owns u. As shown above, user selects ρ 1 , z ∈ R Z p and computes ψ 1 = g uρ 1 ψ 2 = g ρ 1 as commitment. Then authority AA chooses ρ 2 ∈ R Z p . The two-party protocol (2PC protocol) takes (u, ρ 1 ) from the user and (ρ 2 , β k ) from AA, and returns η = (u + β k )ρ 1 ρ 2 mode p to AA. The specific operations of the protocol are given as follows:
1) The user u chooses z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ∈ Z p , and computes T = g z h u , P = h
1 . The user u sends (T , T , P, P ) to AA. 2) AA chooses c ← R Z p , and sends c to the user u.
3) The user u calculates 
2) The user chooses c 1 ∈ R Z p , and sends it to AA. 3) AA calculates
, and sends them to the user.
4) The user verifies
The proposed anonymous key issuing protocol is both leakfree and selective-failure blind.
We ignored the proofs of both leak-free and selectivefailure blind for the proposed anonymous key issuing protocol since they are similar with those in [10, 12] .
VIII. USER COLLUSION
We use two methods which have been used to verify that the proposed solution can resist collusion attacks. and D u 1 = h u 1 . One can find e(g, h) su 1 (β 1 +β 2 )+sβ 3 u 3 , the component of X , cannot be generated by u 1 and u 2 . The attack of section 4 is invalid to the proposed scheme.
IX. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will give some comparisons of the proposed scheme with the scheme of Y. Rahulamathavam et al. Some are shown in the Table 1 . From the Table 1 , one can obtain the key size, ciphertext size are shorter than those in scheme [12] . In the decryption phase, we have lower computation cost than that in [12] . Additionally, it is very significant that the proposed scheme meets the security requirement (collusion avoidance). In Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show that the proposed scheme is better than scheme [12] in Encryption and Decryption cost. Based on the Table 1 , Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , the proposed scheme is more practical than the scheme in [12] .
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss how to built the securely decentralized KP-ABE. Based on a security analysis of the scheme of Y. Rahulamathavam et al, we propose an improvement scheme and show that the scheme can resist collusion attacks existing in the recent works. The security of the proposed scheme is reduced to the standard complexity assumptionDecisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
